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In February 1995, The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted resolutions recommending, inter alia, the repeal of joint and several
liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return under I.R.C. § 6013(d), and
an amendment to I.R.C. § 66 that would override the holding of Poe v. Seaborn'
so that a married taxpayer who lives in a community property state will not be
individually liable for income tax on any portion of the income earned by the
other spouse. Both Congress and the Treasury Department have shown interest
in the issues raised by the resolutions. Section 401 of the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 22 directs the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, and the
Comptroller General of the United States each to conduct separate studies
concerning the effects of repealing joint and several liability of spouses for the
tax on a joint return and some of the effects of treating community income as
income of the earning spouse.
Before the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 was enacted, the Internal Revenue
Service("Service") and the Treasury Department had begun a study of the tax
issues facing divorced and separated spouses who filed joint returns.' The
Service invited public comments for the study in Notice 96-19." Notice 96-19
provides a number of questions regarding the consequences of adopting a
proportionate liability standard that "would hold each spouse liable for only that
portion of the tax attributable to a joint return that relates to that spouse's
contribution to the aggregate joint return tax liability of both spouses."5 In other
words, a proportionate liability standard generally would require each spouse who
signed a joint return to pay deficiencies, interest, and additions to tax only with
respect to that spouse's income.'
Application of a proportionate liability standard could exacerbate the
problems caused by the rule of Poe v. Seaborn. Under Poe v.Seaborn, each
spouse in a community property state is individually liable for the tax on one-
half of the community income, regardless of which spouse actually earns the
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5. I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371, 372.
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income.7 One of the proposals for which the Service requested comments in
Notice 96-19 was the proposal to further limit the income-splitting effect of Poe
v. Seaborn in community property jurisdictions!
The Domestic Relations Committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar
Association responded to all of the specific questions set out in Notice 96-19,
except the questions concerning the limitation of the income-splitting effect of
Poe v. Seaborn. In the Domestic Relations Committee's "Comments on Liability
of Divorced Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns,"9
the Committee stated that it did not wish to comment on the proposal to limit the
income-splitting effect of Poe v. Seaborn in community property jurisdictions.
This article addresses the issues that were not discussed by the Domestic
Relations Committee by arguing that Congress should override the rule of Poe
v. Seaborn.
The inequities that result from the rule of Poe v. Seaborn are well-
documented and have been discussed in a number of law review articles.'0 In
the typical case, a married couple is living together in a community property
state, and no income tax return is filed. The tax liability for the year of the
nonfiling is attributable, in large part, to income earned by one of the spouses
(the "earning spouse"). The other spouse (the "nonearning spouse") has little or
no income to report. Several years later, after the couple is divorced, the Internal
Revenue Service asserts a tax deficiency against the nonearning spouse and may
garnish the nonearning spouse's wages earned after the divorce for the tax due
on one-half of the other spouse's income. Because the income tax on the entire
community income is a debt incurred by one of the spouses during the marriage
and on behalf of the community" (sometimes referred to as a "community
debt"), the Service also may seize former community assets that are held by the
nonearning spouse to satisfy the other spouse's tax liability for the remaining
one-half of the community income."
7. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
8. I.R.S. Notice 96-19(D), 1996-1 C.B. 371.
9. 50 Tax Law. 395, 411 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More
Equitable Approach, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 633 and John A. Miller, Federal Income Taxation and
Community Property Law: The Case for Divorce, 44 Sw. L.J. 1087 (1990).
II. Some states distinguish between debts that are incurred on behalf of the community and
separate debts. For example, in Bank of Washington v. Hilltop Shakemill, Inc.. 614 P.2d 1319
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980), the husband, without informing the wife, promised on behalf of himself and
his marital community to guarantee payment of his son's business obligations. The court held that
the community did not expect to benefit economically as a result of the guarantee, that the bank to
whom the guarantee was given knew that it was not executed for business purposes, and, therefore,
the community was not liable for payment pursuant to the guarantee. Id. at 1322-23. In most
jurisdictions, however, debts incurred by either spouse during the marriage are presumed to benefit
the community unless it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that there was no
community benefit. W.S. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States § 10:4 (1982)
and I Ann Oldfather et al., Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 20.07[l] (1997).
12. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-215(D) (West 1991); Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ.
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The rule of Poe v. Seaborn also can be particularly harsh with respect to a
separated spouse who lives in a community property state and files a separate
income tax return. In that case, the nonearning spouse is expected to report and
pay tax on one-half of the income earned by the other spouse, regardless of
whether the nonearning spouse receives any of the income and regardless of
whether the noneaming spouse even knows the amount of income earned by the
other spouse."
Code art. 2357; N.M. Stat Ann. § 40-3-I1(A)(Michie Supp. 1994); Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2)(b) (1993).
See also Inwood Nat. Bank of Dallas v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) and Broadway
Drugstore of Galveston v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968). But see Cal. Fain.
Code § 916(a)(2) (West 1994) (community property received by a person in a division of community
property is not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse during the marriage, and the person
is not personally liable for the debt unless the debt was assigned for payment by the person in the
division of the property) and Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 5.61(bX2) (West 1993) (unless both spouses
are personally liable for a debt, community property subject to a spouse's sole management, control,
and disposition is not subject to any nontortious liabilities that the other spouse incurs during the
marriage).
13. I.R.C. § 66 (1995) alleviates this problem, at least if the spouses are separated during the
entire calendar year and the noneaming spouse receives no amount of community income from the
other spouse during the year. Under I.R.C. § 66(a), the noneaming spouse is not liable for
community income earned by the other spouse (except for amounts derived from community
property) if: (I) the spouses live apart at all times during the calendar year; (2) the spouses do not
file a joint return for the taxable year; (3) one or both of the spouses has earned income for the
calendar year which is community income; and (4) no portion of the earned income that is
community income is transferred (directly or indirectly) between the spouses before the close of the
calendar year. I.R.C. § 66(a), however, provides no protection from liability to a noneaming spouse
during the first year of separation unless the spouses are separated before January 1. Under I.R.C.
§ 66(b) and (c), there seems to be some protection provided to a nonearning spouse even if the
spouses live together during the taxable year. The protection provided under I.R.C. § 66(b) and (c),
however, is difficult to obtain because of the stringent requirements that must be satisfied under those
subsections. To qualify for relief from liability for the tax on one-half of the community income
earned by the other spouse under § 66(c), the nonearning spouse must prove that: (I) the nonearming
spouse did not know of, and had no reason to know of, the item of community income that the
noneaming spouse did not report on a separate return; and (2) taking into account all of the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to include the item of community income in the nonearning spouse's
gross income. In.many cases, it is difficult for the noneaming spouse to prove that he or she did not
know of, and had no reason to know of, the omitted item of community income. Under I.R.C. §
66(b), the Service may disallow the benefits of any community property law to the earning spouse
with respect to any community income if the earning spouse acted as if he or she were solely entitled
to the income and failed to notify the noneaming spouse before the due date for filing the income
tax return of the nature and amount of the community income. The earning spouse can avoid
application of § 66(b) by providing the proper notice to the noneaming spouse. The most significant
problem under § 66(b), however, is that the provision merely authorizes the Service to collect the
tax from the earning spouse; there is no requirement that the Service pursue the earner for the entire.
tax due on the community income. For a discussion of the inadequate protection afforded to a
nonearning spouse in a community property state under I.RLC. § 66, see Stuart J. Filler, Joint and
Several Income Tax Liability and Community Properly Income Attribution: Continuing Problems for
the Unwary Spouse, 9 Community Prop. J. 131 (1982); William J. Minick, III, 7he Innocent Spouse
Doctrine: The Need for Reform and Planning Alternatives in the State of Texas, 66 Taxes 56 (1988);
John Paul Parks, Income Tax Relieffor the Abandoned Spouse, 12 Community Prop. J. 119 (1985);
19971
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The rule of Poe v. Seaborn imposes an inappropriate tax burden on the
nonearning spouse. Under current law, the Service may seize separate property
from the noneaming spouse to satisfy the tax liability for one-half of the
community income, and in all community property states except California, the
Service also may seize community property or former community property from
the nonearning spouse to satisfy the remaining tax liability for all of the income
earned by the other spouse.14 If Congress were to override Poe v. Seaborn, the
Nancie Quick & Joseph N. DuCanto, Joint Tax Liability and the "Innocent Spouse" Doctrine in
Common Law and Community Property Jurisdictions: A Review of Code Section 6013(e) and its
Progeny, Section 66, 17 Family L.Q. 65 (1983); Stuart Salchow, IRC Section 66: Relief for
Abandoned Spouses? 10 Community Prop. 1. 121 (1983).
In Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g and rem "g, 66 T.C. 817 (1976),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to fashion a remedy for a
noneaming spouse in a community property state who is required to pay tax on one-half of the
community income attributable to the other spouse's earnings. In Bagur, the court held that the
nonearning spouse could deduct as a theft loss amounts of community income that the earner
appropriated to his or her own use. Id. at 501. Unfortunately, none of the reported cases after Bagur
have allowed a noneaming spouse to claim a theft loss deduction with respect to community income
that was earned and spent by the other spouse. See generally Lucia v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1982 (199i); Conner v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (1982); Schmidt v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (198 1); Hall v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349 (1980).
The question of whether a theft loss has been sustained for federal income tax purposes is determined
by reference to the criminal law of the jurisdiction where the loss occurred. Packard v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 435 (1985) and Monteleone v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960).
Most jurisdictions define the term theft to require an intent to deprive a person of the item that is
misappropriated. See. e.g., La. R.S. 14:67 (1986). Spouses claiming a theft loss deduction with
respect to community income have had difficulty proving the requisite fraudulent intent of the
earning spouse.
Even if a theft loss deduction were allowed to the noneaming spouse, the amount that could be
deducted is significantly limited. A theft loss deduction can be claimed only for the year in which
the theft is discovered. I.RC. § 165(e) (1995). Thus, it is likely that any deduction allowable to the
noneaming spouse will be taken in a different year from the year in which one-half of the community
income is included in the spouse's income. The mismatching of the income and the deduction can
be problematic because the nonearning spouse will owe interest and possibly penalties with respect
to the year in which the community income was excluded from the noneaming spouse's return. It
is likely that the deduction in the later year will not offset the tax liability, interest, and additions to
tax for the year in which the community income was deducted. The theft loss deduction that could
be available for a noneaming spouse under Bagur is not incurred in connection with a trade or
business and, therefore, is subject to several limitations. First, a nonbusiness theft loss deduction is
an itemized deduction and is advantageous to a taxpayer only to the extent that all of the taxpayer's
itemized deductions exceed the taxpayer's standard deduction for the year. Second, the amount of
the loss is reduced by $100. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (1995). If the taxpayer claiming a nonbusiness theft
loss has no personal casualty gains for the year, the amount of the theft loss must be reduced further
by ten percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 165(hX2) (1995). After application
of the rules limiting a taxpayer's ability to deduct a nonbusiness theft loss, a nonearning spouse could
have little advantage even if a theft loss were allowed with respect to the one-half of the community
income required to be reported on the noneaming spouse's seplrate tax return.
14. Under California community property law, the Service would not be permitted to proceed
against former community property held by the nonearning spouse unless the noneaming spouse had
been assigned the liability for payment of the tax when the community property was divided. See
[Vol. 58
SUSAN KALINKA
Service would be placed in the position of any other community creditor with
respect to the noneaming spouse and limited in its collection efforts to seizing
community property or former community property held by the noneaming
spouse to satisfy the tax due on the community income. Overriding Poe v.
Seaborn would protect the wages earned by the nonearning spouse after a divorce
from garnishment to satisfy the tax liability for income earned by the other
spouse during the marriage.
Overriding Poe v. Seaborn would not necessarily wreak havoc on the public
fisc. If Congress were to override Poe v. Seaborn, the earning spouse would be
individually liable for the tax on the community income earned by that spouse.
In that case, the Service could seize separate property owned by the earner as
well as any community property or former community property held by either
of the spouses in satisfaction of the tax liability.
This article does not dwell on the inequities or the anomalies caused by the
rule of Poe v. Seaborn. Instead, this article will argue the case for overriding
Poe v. Seaborn by analyzing community property law. The rule of Poe v
Seaborn is contrary to three precepts of fundamental tax law: (1) that similarly
situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly; (2) that income should be taxed to
the person who earns it; and (3) that the incidence of the income tax should fall
on the person who has the power to control the disposition of the income.
The rule of Poe v. Seaborn undermines the uniform application of the tax
law because it requires the amount of a spouse's tax liability on income earned
by the other spouse to depend on the state in which the spouses are domiciled
when separate returns, or no returns, are filed. Unlike a spouse who resides in
Cal. Fain. Code § 916(a)(2) (West 1994) and In re Marriage of Bruendle, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397 (Cal.
CL App. 1996). In Texas, the community property subject to a spouse's sole management, control,
and disposition is not subject to any nontortious liabilities incurred by the other spouse during the
marriage unless both spouses are personally liable for the debt. Tex. Fano. Code Ann. § 5.61(bX(2)
(West 1993). Thus, it seems that a creditor may not seize from a nondebtor spouse any community
property awarded to the nondebtor spouse after the divorce. A creditor, however, may seize former
community property received by the nondebtor spouse pursuant to a divorce decree if the property
was subject to the management and control of the spouse who incurred the debt or was subject to
the management and control of both spouses during the marriage. Cy Inwood Nat'l Bank of Dallas
v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct App. 1980). For a discussion of the rights of creditors to seize
former community property from a former spouse in Texas who did not incur a community
obligation, see Thomas M. Featherston, Jr. & Lynda S. Still, Marital Liability in Texas ... 7ill
Death, Divorce, or Bankruptcy Do They Part, 44 Baylor L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (1992). Some courts,
while recognizing the rule that a creditor may seize former community property held by a spouse to
satisfy a community debt incurred by the other spouse, have held that a judgment creditor could not
seize former community property held by the nonincurring spouse where a judgment was obtained
after the divorce against only the spouse who incurred the debt. See, e.g., Stewart Title Co. v.
Huddleston, 598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) and Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 599 P.2d
1289 (Wash. 1979). It is not certain whether the state law restrictions on the ability of a creditor to
seize former community property from a spouse who did not incur a community obligation will apply
against the Service. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971) (former
La. Civ. Code art. 2410 permitting a wife to renounce the community, thereby retroactively absolving
herself of all community debts, was not effective against the federal tax collector).
1997)
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a community property state, a spouse who resides in a noncommunity property
state is not liable for any of the tax on the earning spouse's income unless a joint
return is filed."5 Admittedly, community property law gives a nonearning
spouse important rights with respect to community property, including
community income, that are not available to a spouse in a noncommunity
property state. However, the differences in the rights of spouses under
community property law and the rights of spouses under the law of the
noncommunity property states do not warrant the differences in the allocation of
the tax liability.
The rule of Poe v. Seaborn also is at odds with fundamental principles of
federal tax law. In general, income is taxed to the person who earns it. 6
Moreover, a taxpayer's dominion over income generally is a key factor in
determining the taxpayer's liability for the tax on the income. 7 Community
property law does not give a nonearning spouse sufficient control over the
disposition of community income earned by the other spouse to warrant imposing
a tax liability on the nonearning spouse for any of the earner's income.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE OF POE .SEABORA-OWNERSHIP
The rule of Poe v. Seaborn prevents uniform application of the federal tax
law. As explained above, a spouse who lives in a community property state is
required to report and pay tax on one-half of the income earned by each of the
spouses. Thus, if no joint return is filed or if the spouses file separate income
tax returns, a nonearning spouse in a community property state is required to pay
tax on one-half of the other spouse's income. In contrast, a spouse who lives in
a noncommunity property state has no liability for the tax on income earned by
the other spouse unless a joint return is filed."
The rule of Poe v. Seaborn is not a matter of constitutional law. In Poe v.
Seaborn, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the meaning of sections
210(a) and 211 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as they applied to the interests of
spouses in community property states. These sections imposed a tax on the net
income "of' every individual. The current provisions, section 1(a) through 1(e)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, also impose a tax on the income "of'
every individual.
IS. See I.R.C. § 6013(dX3) (1995) (each spouse is jointly and severally liable for the tax on
a joint return).
16. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I1l, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426,431, 75 S. Ct. 473,477 (1955)
(defining income as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion") (emphasis added). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144
(1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376,
50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).




In Poe v. Seaborn, the Court determined that the word "of' denotes
ownership. Under community property law, each spouse has an ownership
interest in all community property. Community property generally is defined as
all property, other than "separate property," which is acquired during the
marriage by either spouse while the couple is domiciled in a community property
state.' 9 Thus, community property includes income earned by either spouse
during the marriage.
The statutes of several community property states provide that each spouse
has a present, vested, one-half ownership interest in community property.20 On
the termination of the community, each spouse is entitled to receive a share of
the community property remaining after satisfaction of creditors' claims. Thus,
if the spouses divorce, each spouse generally may receive a share of the
community property." Likewise, on the death of either spouse, his or her share
of the community property passes to the decedent spouse's heirs by that spouse's
will or the law of intestate succession. 22 The so-called "equal management"
statutes give each spouse managerial rights over community property.23 A
spouse may prevent the disposition of certain community assets by the other
spouse." Either spouse may contract debts during the marriage that may be
19. See, e.g.. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-211, 25-213 (West 1991); Cal. Fain. Code § 760
(West 1994); Idaho Code §§ 32-905, 32-906 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2338; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 123.220 (Michie 1995); N.M. Stat Ann. § 40-3-8(B) (Michie Supp. 1994); Tex. Fano. Code Ann.
§ 5.01(b) (West 1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (West 1997); Wis. Stat. § 766.31(1)
(1993).
20. See. e.g., Cal. Pam. Code § 751 (West 1994); La. Civ. Code art. 2336; Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 123.225(I) (Michie 1995); Wis. Stat. § 766.31(3) (1993).
2 I. The community property law of some states provides that each spouse is entitled to receive
one-half of the community property on divorce. See Cal. Fam. Code § 2550 (West 1994); La. Civ.
Code art. 2336; Michelson v. Michelson, 520 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1974). A number of the community
property states, however, provide for an equitable distribution of property between the spouses on
a divorce. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318(A) (West 1991); Idaho Code § 32-712 (1996); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125.150(l) (Michie 1995); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 3.63 (West 1993), as
interpreted in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 2 10 (Tex. 1982) and Eggemeyer v. Eggeeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977). In the equitable distribution states, one spouse may receive more than one-
half of the community property while the other spouse receives less than one-half of the community
property.
22. William A. Reppy & Cynthia Samuel, Community Property in the United States 309 (2d
ed. 1982). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2102, 14-3101(A) (West 1995); Cal. Prob. Code §§
6101(b), (c), 6401(a) (West 1991); Idaho Code §§ 15-2-102(b), 15-3-101 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
123.250 (Michie 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-805,45-3-101(B)(Michie Supp. 1995); Tex. Prob.
Code Ann. § 45 ((West Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.02.070 (West 1997); Wis. Stat.
§ 861.01(!) (1991).
23. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 25-214 (B) (West 1991); Cal. Fain. Code § I I00(a)(West
1994); Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2346; Nev. Rev. Stat § 123.230 (Michie
1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-14 (A) (Michie Supp. 1994); Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 5.22(c) (West
1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (West 1997); Wis. Sta. § 766.51(IXam) (1993).
24. See. e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 25-214(C) (joinder required for transactions for the
acquisition, disposition, or encumbrance of an interest in real property and any transaction of
guaranty, indenity, or suretyship); Cal. Fain. Code §§ 1100(b), (c), 1102 (West 1994) (written
1997]
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satisfied with community property." Thus, in Poe v. Seaborn, the Supreme
Court determined that the ownership rights of spouses in community property are
sufficient to justify the imposition of a tax liability on each spouse for one-half
of the community income.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE RIGHTS OF SPOUSES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY
STATES AND NONCOMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES---DIVORCE AND DEATH
As a practical matter, however, the rights that each spouse has in community
property are not sufficiently different from the rights that spouses have in marital
property under common law property regimes to warrant the disparate taxation
of spouses, depending on whether they reside in a community property state or
a noncommunity property state. Under common law property regimes, spouses
have interests in each other's property that are similar to the interests of spouses
in community property states.
A. Rights to Property on Divorce
The greatest similarity between the community property states and the
noncommunity property states with respect to a spouse's rights in property
acquired after the marriage concerns the rights of a spouse to receive property on
divorce. Like spouses in a community property state, each spouse in a noncom-
munity property state may be entitled to receive a portion of the property owned
by either or both spouses upon divorce.2" A number of noncommunity property
consent of a spouse required for gifts of community personal property; the sale, conveyance, or
encumbrance of community personal property used as the family dwelling or household furnishings;
and transactions involving community real estate); Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996) (joinder required for
the sale, conveyance or encumbrance of community real estate); La. Civ. Code art. 2347 (1985)
(concurrence of both spouses is required for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community
immovables, furniture, or furnishings while located in the family home, or all or substantially all of
the assets of a community enterprise and movables issued or registered in the names of the spouses
jointly); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230(2), (3), (4), (5) (joinder required for gifts of community property;
sale, conveyance, encumbrance, or purchase of community property; and sale or encumbrance of
household goods); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13 (Michie Supp. 1994) (joinder required for transactions
concerning community real property); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030(2), (3), (4) (5) (1997)
(joinder required for gifts of community property; sale, conveyance, encumbrance, or purchase of
community real estate; sale or encumbrance of household furnishings or a community mobile home);
Wis. Stat. § 766.53 (1993) (joinder required for gifts aggregating more than either $1,000 or a larger
amount, if reasonable, made to any one person during a calendar year).
25. See McClanahan, supra note II, § 10:8 ("It is axiomatic that a creditor holding a community
debt may reach property held as community property by a husband and wife to satisfy the debt.").
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 25-215(D) (1991); Cat. Fain. Code Ann § 910 (West 1994); Idaho-
Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2345 (1985); N.M. Stat Ann. § 40-3-11(A) (Michie Supp.
1994); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 5.61(c), (d) (West 1993); Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2XB) (1993).
26. See 2 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 15.1 (2d
ed. 1987) and 1 Oldfather et al, supra note 11, § 3.01[2].
[Vol. 58
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states have statutes that classify the spouses' property as marital or separate
property and authorize the divorce court to divide the marital property equally
between the spouses." Most states,. including community property states, have
adopted equitable distribution statutes, which permit a divorce court to divide
property that is subject to the statute "equitably" or "in just proportions" between
the spouses.2" Thus, regardless of whether a couple resides in a community
property state or a noncommunity property state, it is possible for one spouse to
receive, upon divorce, more than one-half of the marital or community property
and the other spouse to receive less than one-half of the property.
B. Death of a Spouse
Spouses in all noncommunity property states also have rights to marital
property on the death of a spouse. Federal law provides rights to surviving
spouses in retirement benefits of the decedent spouse. For example, the social
security system pays retirement benefits to a worker and the worker's surviving
spouse. 9 The worker has no right to shift the survivor's benefit to a person other
than the spouse.30
Similarly, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") 3' requires that a spouse of an employee must have survivorship rights
if the employee predeceases the spouse. 2 If an employee spouse survives to
retirement age, the accrued benefit under a qualified plan must be provided in the
form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity unless the nonemployee spouse
consents to waive the joint and survivor form of the benefit." If the employee
dies before retirement and the pension rights are vested, a preretirement survivor
annuity must be provided to the surviving spouse. 4 ERISA preempts state law
with respect to the rights of a surviving spouse in a pension plan. s
27. See 2 Clark, supra note 26, § 15.1 and I Oldfather et al., supra note II, § 3.03[2].
28. 1 Oldfather etal., supra note 1, § 3.01[2] n.l,§ 3.01[3], § 20.04[1][a][ii] nn. 9-13. The
community property states that have adopted equitable distribution statutes are Arizona, Idaho,
Nevada, Texas, and Washington. See Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 25-318(A) (1991); Idaho Code § 32-
712 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(l)(b) (1995); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 3.63 (West 1993), as
interpreted in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982) and Eggcmeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.080 (1997).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), (0.
30. Social security benefits, however, may be paid to a deceased worker's dependents as well
as to the worker's surviving spouse. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (benefits payable to a decedent
worker's child).,
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1988 and Supp. 1991).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1), (cXIXA), (cX2XA). Spousal consent is not required, however, if
it is established to the satisfaction of a plan representative that the spouse's consent cannot be
obtained because the spouse cannot be located or because of other circumstances as the Secretary of
the Treasury may prescribe by regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2XB).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(aX2).
35. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) and Alabamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th
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State law also provides significant rights to surviving spouses in noncommu-
nity property states. Most noncommunity property states have laws to ensure
support for a surviving spouse. For example, many states have homestead laws
designed to give the surviving spouse the right to occupy the family home for
his or her lifetime by protecting at least a portion of the value of the family
home from the testamentary caprices of the deceased spouse and the demands of
the deceased spouse's creditors. 6 There are also various statutory allowances
of personal property for the benefit of a surviving spouse in a noncommunity
property state." Such laws set aside to the surviving spouse items such as
clothing, furniture, appliances, supplies, tools, books, domestic animals, and
automobiles." Every state has a statute authorizing the probate court to award
the surviving spouse (and often the surviving children) an allowance for support
for a fixed period (typically one year) or during the administration of the
estate.39 The homestead exemption, the personal property set-aside, and the
surviving spouse's right to support cannot be defeated by will.
In addition to the support rights discussed above, most noncommunity
property states give the surviving spouse a right to an "elective share" (some-
times referred to as a "forced share") in the decedent spouse's property.'
Under the elective share provisions, a surviving spouse has a right to elect to
receive one-third to one-half of the decedent spouse's property in lieu of the
amounts provided in the decedent's will."'
A few jurisdictions that have retained the common law rights to dower and
curtesy provide that the surviving spouse has certain rights in the decedent
spouse's real property." Common law dower gave a widow a life estate in
one-third of the lands of which her husband was seized; curtesy gave a husband
a present right in all lands owned by his wife in fee-simple or fee-tail."' These
rights have been modified by statute to allow the surviving spouse, whether a
Cir. 1991).
36. For a description of the homestead laws, see Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law
of Wills § 34 (2d ed. 1953) and Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates
478-79 (5th ed. 1995).
37. For a discussion of the personal property set-aside provisions, see Atkinson, supra note 36,
§ 34 and Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 36, at 479-80. See also U.P.C. § 2-403 (1990).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers and Trusts Law § 5-3.1.
39. For a discussion of the family allowance, see Atkinson, supra note 36, § 34 and
Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 36, at 480-82.
40. For a discussion of the elective share provisions, see Atkinson, supra note 36, § 30 and
Dukeminier & Johanson supra note 36, at 483-89. 492-93. 500-35.
41. Atkinson, supra note 36, § 30.
42. The states that still recognize a modified form of dower and curtesy include Arkansas,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-11-301;28-11-305 (Michie 1987
& Supp. 1995); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 533-1, -16 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 392.010. .020 (Banks-
Baldwin 1988); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 189, §§ 1-16 (Law. Co-op. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
2103.02-.09 (Banks-Baldwin 1993). For a discussion of dower and curtesy, see Atkinson, supra note
36, § 29 and Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 213 (2d ed. 1993).
43. Cunningham et al., supra note 42, § 2.13.
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wife or a husband, to one-third or one-half of the deceased spouse's lands in
fee." In states where dower and curtesy still exist, a surviving spouse also has
a right to a forced share of the decedent spouse's property."5 In such states, the
surviving spouse must elect between dower or curtesy and an intestate share if
the other spouse died intestate, or between dower or curtesy and a forced share
if the other spouse died testate."
Admittedly, a nonearning spouse has a more significant interest in
community property than a nonearning spouse has in the property of the other
spouse under common law property regimes. Under community property law,
a nonearning spouse is entitled to receive one-half of the community property on
the death of the earner, as opposed to the one-third share that is available to
surviving spouses in many noncommunity property states. Of greater impor-
tance, perhaps, is the rule that the nonearning spouse's one-half share of the
community property passes to his or her heirs by will or intestate succession even
if the nonearning spouse predeceases the earning spouse. Thus, community
property law gives the noneaming spouse significant control over community
assets, at least at death.
However, the rights of a predeceasing spouse with respect to the disposition
of one-half of the community property are not absolute. The United States
Supreme Court recently has undermined the ability of a predeceasing spouse to
pass to the spouse's heirs an important community asset. In Boggs v. Boggs, 7
the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempts application of community property
laws which would have allowed a predeceasing spouse to pass by testamentary
instrument the spouse's interest in the other spouse's undistributed plan benefits.
The holding in Boggs is broad enough to preclude a predeceasing spouse from
passing an interest in the other spouse's undistributed plan benefits by the law
of intestate succession. In many cases, pension rights will be a couple's most
significant item of community property.
Moreover, the most significant rights that a nonearning spouse has with
respect to the income earned by the other spouse may not be enjoyed until the
community has terminated. In most cases, a nonearning spouse in a community
property state may exercise control over community assets, including community
income, only when those assets are distributed to the spouse as a result of a
divorce or the death of a spouse or other event causing the community to
terminate. In this respect, the nonearning spouse's interest in community
property is like the inchoate rights of a noneaming spouse in the property
accumulated by the other spouse in a noncommunity property state.
As explained below, the current statutes concerning the management of
community property generally permit the earning spouse to determine how the
44. Id. § 2.14.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997).
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community income is to be spent during the existence of the community. Under
these rules, it is possible for the earning spouse to consume a good portion of the
community income before any of it is available to the nonearning spouse on
termination of the community. It is inappropriate to tax the nonearning spouse
currently on income over which the nonearning spouse has no current control.
HII. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OVER COMMUNITY INCOME
Under community property law, each spouse owns an undivided one-half
interest in all community property, including community income earned by either
of the spouses. The rule of Poe v. Seaborn allocating the tax liability for one-
half of the community income to each of the spouses, regardless of which spouse
earned the income, is based on legal title. The rule ignores two fundamental
principles of tax law, under which (1) income is taxed to the person who earns
the income/s and (2) the individual who has the power to dispose of income
generally is the person who is liable for the tax on it." It is obvious that the
rule of Poe v. Seaborn ignores the first principle. An analysis of the limitations
on the rights of a nonearing spouse to dispose of community income reveals the
impropriety of imposing an income tax liability on the nonearning spouse in a
community property state.
A. Equal, or Separate-But-Equal, Management of Community Property
At the time that Poe v. Seaborn was decided, most of the community
property statutes contained "head-and-master"provisions granting to the husband
broad powers of administration and control over community property."0 Critics
of the rule of Poe v. Seaborn argued that the head-and-master provisions
deprived the wife of sufficient control over community income to justify the
requirement that she pay tax on one-half of the community income.5
By 1981, all of the community property states had repealed their head-and
master provisions, replacing them with so-called "equal management" provi-
sions.sa If the equal management provisions actually gave powers to a nonearn-
ing spouse over the administration or control of community income earned by
the other spouse, it would be difficult to contend that the rule of Poe v. Seaborn
is incorrect.
48. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1t1, 114-15, 50S. Ct. 241, 241 (1930).
49. See supra cases cited at note 17.
50. For a discussion of the head-and-master provisions, see McClanahan, supra note II, § 9:3.
51. See. e.g., Reka Potgieter-Hoff, Why Tax a Separated Spouse on Community Income She
Does Not Receive?, 7 Community Prop. J. 61, 66 (1980); J. Emmett Sebree, Federal Taxation of
Community Property, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 301 (1934); Warner H. Anthony, Jr., Note, Federal Tax
Liability of the Wfe for Community Income Earned by the Husband, 32 La. L. Rev. 471, 474 (1972).




However, using the term "equal management" to describe these statutes is
inaccurate, at least with respect to the management of community income. The
current statutes concerning ihe management of community income are more
appropriately described as "separate management" statutes. In many respects, a
nonearning spouse's ability to determine the disposition of community income
is similar to the ability of a nonearning spouse in a noncommunity property state
to determine how income earned by the other spouse will be utilized. The equal
management statutes generally give management and control over community
income to the spouse who earns it.
For example, the Texas management statute" expressly gives the sole
management, control, and disposition over community income to the spouse who
earns it. In fact, commentators have referred to the Texas management scheme
as either "divided" management or "separate and equal" management.5 ' The
Texas management statute divides community property into three funds: "his,"
"hers," and "theirs."" Under the statute, each spouse has the sole management,
control, and disposition of community property that the spouse would have
owned if single.' The property designated for separate management includes,
but is not limited to: personal earnings, revenue from separate property,
recoveries for personal injuries, and the increase and mutations of, and the
revenue from, all property subject to the spouse's sole management, control, and
disposition.'7
Spouses in Texas have joint management of community property that is
normally subject to the sole management of one of the spouses if it has been
mixed with property subject to the sole management of the other spouse unless
the spouses provide otherwise.5" Thus, the Texas statute provides management
powers over community income to the spouse who earns it unless the earning
spouse chooses to give some or all of it to the nonearner, for example, by
depositing it into a joint bank account, thereby mixing it with property subject
to the control of the nonearner. The Texas regime, in this respect, provides
management rights with respect to community income that are similar to the
rights of a spouse in a noncommunity property state with respect to the
management, control, and disposition of income earned by the other spouse.
The statutes of the other community property states do not divide manage-
ment of community property as distinctly as the Texas statute. In general, the
other statutes recite that either spouse has management and control over
53. Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 5.22 (West 1993).
54. See, e.g., McClanahan, supra note II, § 9:8; Reppy & Samuel, supra note 22, at 205;
William 0. Huie, Divided Management of Community Property in Texas, S Tex. Tech L. Rev. 623,
passim (1974); Ronald G. Williams, Comment, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code: Control and
Management of the Marital Estate, 27 Sw. L.J. 837, 841-42 (1973).
55. McClanahan, supra note 11, § 9:8.
56. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 5.22(a) (West 1993).
57. Id.
58. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 5.22(b) (West 1993).
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community property. 9 As a practical matter, however, the spouse who earns
community income will have control over its disposition60 Notwithstanding the
equal management statutes, it often is necessary to vest control over community
property in only one spouse in order to protect the rights of third parties.
For example, a spouse who manages a community business often will have
the sole management of the community assets belonging to the business and of
the income generated from the business. To prevent unwelcome interference by
a spouse who does not participate in the community business and to protect third
parties who deal with the managing spouse, several states have adopted statutes
giving sole management of personal property used in the business to the spouse
who alone manages the business." Such statutes give the spouse who manages
59. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(B) (West 1991); Cal. Fain. Code § I 100(a) (West 1994);
Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2346; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230 (Michie 1995);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-14(A) (Michie 1994 Supp.); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (West 1997).
60. For a discussion of the equal management statutes and the potential for exclusive
management of community property by one spouse under the equal management statutes, see
McClanahan, supra note 11, at §§ 9:12-9:14; Reppy & Samuel, supra note 22, at 205-14; Katherine
S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes §§ 5.1-5.22, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(2d ed. 1997); George L. Bilbe, "Management" of Community Assets UnderAct 627, 39 La. L. Rev.
409 (1979); Anne K. Bingaman, The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-
Legislative History, 5 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1974); Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under
California's Community Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 Hastings L.J. 227, 229
(1982); Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington (Revised 1985), 61 Wash. L.
Rev. 14, 76-100 (1986); Harry M. Cross, Community Property: A Comparison of the Systems in
Washington and Louisiana, 39 La. L. Rev. 479,486-87 (1979); Harry M. Cross, Equality for Spouses
in Washington Community Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 Wash. L Rev. 527, 541-50
(1973); Elizabeth DeArmond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions
of Community Property Law, 30 Gonz. L. Rev. 235 (1994-95); Richard W. Effland, Arizona
Community Property Law: 77me for Review and Revision, 1982 Ariz. St. LJ. 1, 15-21 (1982);
Kalinka, supra note 10, at 684-99; James S. MacDonald, .The Impact of Equal Management Upon
Community Property Business, 13 Idaho L Rev. 191 (1977): W. Reed Quilliam, Jr., Gratuitous
Transfers of Community Property to Third Persons, 2 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 23 (1970); Janet Mary
Riley, Analysis of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 Loy. L Rev. 4553, 493-505
(1980); William A. Reppy, Jr., Retroactivity of the 1975 Community Property Reforms, 48 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 977, 1013-22 (1975); Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited:
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 116-21
(1979); June Miller Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of the Wisconsin
Experience, 13 Community Prop. J. 1, 18-20 (1986).
61. See. e.g., Cal. Fain. Code § 1100(d) (West 1994) (stating that a spouse who is operating
or managing a business or an interest in a business that is all or substantially all community personal
property generally may act alone in all transactions but must give prior written notice to the other
spouse of any sale, lease, exchange, encumbrance, or other disposition of all or substantially all of
the personal property used in the operation of the business); La. Civ. Code art. 2350 (stating that the
spouse who is the sole manager of a community enterprise generally has the exclusive right to
alienate, encumber, or lease its movables); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(6) (Michie 1995) (stating
that ifonly one spouse participates in the management of a business, that spouse may, in the ordinary
course of business acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber the assets of the business without the
consent of the nonparticipating spouse); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030(6) (West 1997) (same
as the Nevada statute).
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the community business the sole authority to determine whether the community
income earned by the managing spouse will be channeled back into the business
or spent for some other purpose.
Even where there is no express statutory provision regarding the manage-
ment of the community business, the spouse who manages the business also will
control the income earned from the business.6 2 The managing spouse will make
the decisions concerning the community business, including the decision
concerning whether business profits will be reinvested in the business or applied
to another use. Third parties who deal with the business generally will deal with
the managing spouse, to the exclusion of the nonmanaging spouse.
It also is necessary to protect third parties who rely on documents of title.
Accordingly, several community property states have statutes providing that a
spouse has sole management and control of community property held in that
spouse's name. 3 Under the authority of these statutes, a spouse may exercise
exclusive control over his or her earnings by depositing the spouse's community
paycheck in a separate bank account or by investing the money in stocks,
securities, or other property titled in the earning spouse's name."
Even in states where the community property law does not expressly provide
for separate management of titled property, the spouse whose name appears on
the title to the property will be treated as the sole manager of that property.6"
For example, motor vehicle registration statutes give sole management of the
family vehicle to the spouse in whose name the car is titled by requiring the
endorsement of the title certificate for conveyance of the car. Thus, where one
spouse uses his or her earnings to purchase a car and the title is issued in the
purchaser's name only, the earner can prevent the nonearning spouse from selling
it. Securities brokers generally will take instructions from the spouse who
invested the funds in an account and whose name appears on the certificate of
title, rather than from the other spouse. 6 Thus, a spouse may obtain the
exclusive Control over his or her community wages by investing them in
securities titled in the earning spouse's name alone.
All of the community property states that do not have provisions authorizing
the sole management of titled property have adopted the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") concerning commercial paper. 7 Under
these provisions, banks will honor withdrawals only by the person whose name
appears on the account, and negotiable instruments can be transferred only by
62. Effland, supra note 60, at 15.
63. La. Civ. Code art. 2351; N.M. Stat Ann. § 40-3-14(BXl)(Michie Supp. 1994); Tex. Faro.
Code Ann. § 5.24 (West 1993); Wis. Stat. § 766.5 1(lXarn) (1993).
64. Bingaman, supra note 60, at 44.
65. Effland, supra note 60, at 15.
66. Effland, supra note 60, at 15.
67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-3401, -3404, -4207, -4401 (West 1997); Idaho Code §§ 28-3-
401, -3-404, -3-417, -4-401 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 104.3401, .3404, .3417, .4207, .4401
(Michie 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 62A.3-401, -404, -417, 62A.4-207, -401 (West 1995).
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authorized signature. Thus, even if community property law does not confer sole
management over titled property to the spouse in whose name the property is
titled, an earning spouse may exercise control over his or her community
earnings by depositing the funds into a bank account over which the earning
spouse has sole signatory authority or by purchasing a negotiable instrument
titled solely in the earner's name. Under general principles of income taxation,
the earning spouse, who so easily can obtain control over his or her income,
should be liable for the tax on that income.
B. The Joinder Provisions
Community property law requires the joinder of the spouses with respect to
certain transactions concerning community property. The joinder provisions
place some limitations on a spouse's ability to alienate certain property titled in
that spouse's name, thereby giving a nonearning spouse a veto power over the
,disposition of certain assets that. may be purchased with community income
earned by the other spouse.6 However, the joinder statutes in some states offer
no greater rights to a nonearning spouse than are afforded under the joinder
provisions of noncommunity property states. Moreover, the joinder statutes of
community property law often provide insufficient protection to a spouse with
respect to property titled in the name of the other spouse. Furthermore, an
earning spouse in many cases can exclude the nonearning spouse from
management of community income by investing the income in assets that are not
subject to the joinder requirements.
All of the community property states require the joint action of both spouses
with respect to certain transactions involving real property.69 In all of the
community property states, except Texas and Wisconsin, a spouse may not
convey or encumber community real property without the consent of the other
spouse.70 Arguably, a spouse who invests his or her community earnings in real
68. For a discussion of the joinder provisions, see McClanahan, supra note !1, § 9:12.
69. Id.
70. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(C) (West 1991); Cal. Fain. Code § 1102(a) (West 1994);
Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2347; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(3) (Michie
1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13(A) (Michie Supp. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030(3)
(West 1997). Certain community property states also require joinder of the spouses to purchase
community real property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(C)(1) (West 1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 123.230(4) (Michie 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030(4) (West 1997). In some
community property states, a spouse can renounce the right to concur or can give the other spouse
the power to alienate or encumber property alone by express power of attorney. Idaho Code § 32.
912 (1996); La. Civ. Code art. 2348; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230 (Michie 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-3-13(B) (Michie Supp. 1994). In California, Louisiana, and New Mexico, a spouse can ask a
court to dispense with the joinder requirement upon a showing that the nonconsenting spouse is
acting arbitrarily, is incompetent, or cannot be located. Cal. Fain. Code § 1103(c) (West 1994), Cal.
Prob. Code § 3071 (West 1991 and Supp. 1997); La. Civ. Code art. 2355; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-16
(Michie Supp. 1994). Texas and Wisconsin, like the noncommunity property states, have homestead
statutes requiring joinder of the spouses to alienate or encumber the family residence. Tex.
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estate will lose the ability to control those earnings even if the property is titled
in the earning spouse's name alone. However, the earning spouse may avoid the
real estate joinder requirement and retain control over his. or her earnings by
investing in assets other than real estate, such as securitiis, bank certificates of
deposit, or other assets over which the spouse may make unilateral decisions.
The real estate joinder provisions of community property law are similar to
the homestead statutes that have been enacted in all of the noncommunity
property states.7' Under the homestead statutes, both spouses must join in the
conveyance or encumbrance of the family residence. Unlike the provisions of
most of the community property states requiring joinder of the spouses for the
conveyance or encumbrance of all community real estate, the homestead statutes
limit the joinder requirement to alienation or encumbrance of the family
residence. As a practical matter, however, this distinction does not make much
of a difference. In most cases, the only real estate owned by either spouse will
be the family residence. The homestead statutes of the noncommunity property
states give meaningful control to the noneaming spouse over property owned by
the earning spouse by permitting the nonearning spouse to veto the conveyance
or encumbrance of the family residence.
In the few noncommunity property states that have retained the common law
rights to dower and curtesy," both spouses must join in the conveyance of all
real property, no matter which spouse holds title to the property. These rights
are similar to the rights of spouses in all of the community property states except
Texas and Wisconsin.
The community property law of some states also requires joinder of the
spouses for the conveyance or encumbrance of certain personal property. 3
Fain. Code Ann. § 5.81 (West 1993) and Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 706.01-706.02 (West 1981 and Supp.
1996).
71. For a discussion of thejoinder requirement under the homestead statutes, see I Thomas E.
Atkinson et al., American Law of Property § 5.101 (1952); John E. Cribbet & Corwin W. Johnson,
Principles of the Law of Property 94-95 (3d ed. 1989); 1 Richard Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell
on Real Property I 110[4] (1994 and Supp. 1995).
72. For a discussion of the common law rights to dower and curtesy, see authorities cited at
supra note 42.
73. California, Louisiana, Nevada, and Washington require joinder to convey or create a
security interest in community household goods, furniture, or appliances. Cal. Fain. Code § 1100(c)
(West 1994); La. Civ. Code art. 2347;Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(5) (Michie 1995); Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.16.030(5) (West 1997). Louisiana also requires joinder for the alienation, encumbrance,
or lease of all or substantially all of the assets of a community business. La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
While joinder is not required to convey or encumber the assets of a community business in
California, the managing spouse must give prior written notice to the other spouse of any sale, lease,
exchange, or encumbrance of all or substantially all of the personal property used in the operations
of the business unless written notice is prohibited by the law otherwise applicable to the transaction.
Cal. Fain. Code § 1100(d) (West 1994). In Nevada and Washington, joinder is required to convey
or encumber business assets only if the spouses both participate in the community business;
otherwise, the managing spouse may, in the ordinary course of business, alienate or encumber
business assets, including real estate, without the consent of the nonparticipating spouse in the
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Some community property states place restrictions on the ability of a spouse to
make unilateral gifts of community property.'
The joinder provisions of community property law, whether in respect to the
alienation or encumbrance of real or personal property, provide inadequate
protection for the nonconsenting spouse. Because of their inadequacies, the
joinder provisions fail to give a nonearning spouse sufficient control over
property that is controlled by the earning spouse.7
The traditional relief accorded by the joinder provisions permits the
nonconsenting spouse to recapture community property that was transferred
unilaterally to a third party. In California, the nonconsenting spouse cannot
void a transfer of community property without paying the vendee." A spouse
in California may not commence an action to void a unilateral conveyance or
encumbrance of community real estate after the expiration of one year from the
date that the deed or mortgage has been filed.7 ' Once a nonconsenting spouse
discovers the transfer, there may be no remedy under California law if there are
insufficient funds to pay the vendee or if the statute of limitations has run. Even
if a transfer can be avoided, the transferee may have damaged, wasted,
consumed, or destroyed the property. If the nonconsenting spouse does not
discover the transfer until after the community is dissolved, the spouse's remedy
is limited to recapture of one-half of the wrongfully-transferred property. 9 In
such a case, problems arise where the property is indivisible.
ordinary course of business. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(6) (Michie 1995) and Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 26.16.030(6) (West 1997). Arizona and New Mexico require both spouses to sign contracts
of indenity that obligate community property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(CX2) (West 1991)
and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-4 (Michie Supp. 1994).
74. See Cal. Fam. Code § 1100(b) (West 1994) (prohibiting a spouse from making a gift of
community personal property without the written consent of the other spouse unless the gift is a
mutual gift or a gift from one spouse to the other); La. Civ. Code art. 2349 (requiring concurrence
of the spouses for a gift of community property unless the gift is usual or customary and of a value
commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of the donation); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 123.230(2) (Michie 1995) (prohibiting a spouse from making a gift of community property
without the express or implied consent of the other spouse); Wis. Stat. Ann'. § 766.53 (West 1993)
(permitting a gift by a spouse of community property subject to the spouse's management and control
if the value of the marital property given to the third person does not aggregate more than either
$1,000 in a calendar year or a larger amount, if when it is made, the gift is reasonable in amount
considering the spouses' economic position); Anderson v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 292 P.2d 760,
762-63 (Idaho 1956) (gifts other than occasional small gifts of community property are voidable by
the nonconsenting spouse).
75. For a discussion of the inadequate protection accorded under the joinder provisions, see
Reppy & Samuel, supra, note 22, at 215-28 and Bruch, supra note 60, at 279.
76. See, e.g., Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, 812 P.2d 931, 944 (Cal. 1991) and Britton
v. Hammell, 52 P.2d 221, 222 (Cal. 1935).
77. Mark. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 9 P.2d 839, 844 (Cal. 1932).
78. Cal. Fam. Code § 1102(d) (West 1994).
79. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 369 P.2d 481, 482 (Cal. 1962); Trimble v. Trimble, 26 P.2d 477,
480 (Cal. 1933); Pretzer v. Pretzer, 12 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1932).
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A nonconsenting spouse can lose the right to void a unilateral transfer if the
nonconsenting spouse is deemed to have acquiesced in the transfer or to have
ratified it.80  Some courts have applied principles of estoppel to prevent a
nonconsenting spouse from voiding a transfer when the nonconsienting spouse
was aware of the transfer and did not object."'
Some jurisdictions that otherwise require joinder of the spouses permit
unilateral gifts of community property if they are "reasonable."8" Factors in
determining the reasonableness of a gift include the size of the gift in relation to
the total size of the community estate, the adequacy of the remaining estate to
support the nonconsenting spouse in spite of the gift, and the relationship of the
donor to the donee."3 In such jurisdictions, a noneaming spouse may not be
able to recover a gift of community income by the earner if it is determined that
the gift was reasonable. Under the "reasonable gifts" exception, the earning
spouse could transfer a substantial amount of community income simply by
making a large number of small gifts.84 Thus, the joinder provisions provide
inadequate control of community income to. the noneaming spouse to justify
imposing a tax on the noneaming spouse for any of the income earned by the
other spouse.
C. Good-Faith Requirement and Fiduciary Duties
Several community property states limit the ability of the earning spouse to
manage and control the community income by imposing a good-faith requirement
or a fiduciary duty on the spouses with respect to the management of community
property. Only three community property states provide such duties by statute.
Wisconsin imposes a statutory duty of good faith with respect to the management
of community property.as Louisiana community property law provides that a
spouse is liable to the other spouse for any loss or damage caused by fraud or bad
faith in the management of the community property. 6 The California statute
imposes fiduciary duties upon spouses, much like the duties of trustees and
80. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Henderson, 269 P.2d 1108, 1111 (N.M. 1954); Whiting v. Johnson,
390 P.2d 985, 988 (Wash. 1964); In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 141 P.2d 400, 403 (Wash.
1943); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 158 P. 537, 541-42 (Cal. 1916).
81. See, e.g., Reid v. Cramer, 603 P.2d 851 (Wash. 1979).
82. See Wis. Stat. § 766.53 (1993); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W. 2d 52, 55-56 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975); Nixon v. Brown, 214 P. 524 (Nev. 1923). In Louisiana, a spouse may make a gift of
community property if it is a usual or customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic
position of the spouses at the time of the donation. La. Civ. Code art. 2349.
83. See, e.g., Horlock, 533 S.W.2d at 55; Quilliam, supra note 60, at 41-44; Weisberger, supra
note 60, at 32. Wisconsin law permits unilateral gifts if they are reasonable and provides a safe
harbor of S1,000 per donee per year. Wis. Stat. § 766.53 (1993).
84. Williams, supra note 54, at 850.
85. See Wis. Stat. § 766.15 (1993) (requiring each spouse to act in good faith with respect to
the other spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of the spouse).
86. La. Civ. Code art. 2354.
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business partners. The fiduciary duties of a spouse in California.include the duty
to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information
regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the
community has or may have an interest and the debts for which the community is
or may be liable, and to provide equal access to all information, records, and
books that pertain to the value and characterof the community assets and debts."7
A spouse's right to information under California law is available on request."8
Under the old head-and-master statutes, courts imposed liability on the
husband (or the wife if she managed the community property) for fraudulent
mismanagement of community property. 9 In a number of the cases decided
under the old head-and-masterstatutes, the courts refused to impose the fiduciary
duties of a trustee upon the manager.9" In more recent cases, however, courts
have stated that the spouses are fiduciaries with respect to the management of
community property.9
The standard of care required under the current statutes or case law is not
entirely clear. In all of the cases in which the court imposed liability for
mismanagement of community property, the courts found actual or constructive
fraud. While not requiring the complainant to show actual fraud, courts have
required a showing that the breaching spouse's actions indicated an intent to
deprive the complaining spouse of his or her rightful share of the community
property.
Notwithstanding the fiduciary duties imposed by community property law, the
earning spouse in all of the community property states has primary control over
the disposition of the spouse's earnings. Whenever community income is paid in
the form of a negotiable instrument such as a check, the earner will make the
initial decision as to whether the income will be shared with the nonearning spouse
or deposited into an account giving sole signatory power to the earner. Under
general principles of income taxation, the nonearning spouse should not be
personally liable for the tax on any portion of the community income earned by
the other spouse.
In similar settings, taxpayers who have control over the disposition of income
are taxed on the income, notwithstanding their fiduciary duties to the persons who
actually receive the income. For example, the grantor trust rules provide that the
87. Cal. Fain. Code Ann. §§ 721, 1100(e) (West 1994).
88. Id.
89. See William Q. DeFuniak & Michael J. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property §§ 119-
120.1 (2d ed. 1971).
90. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (Cal. 1971) and Hanley v. Most, 115
P.2d 933 (Wash. 1941).
91. See, e.g., Peters v. Skalman, 617 P.2d 448, 452 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Compton v.
Compton, 612 P.2d 1175, 1182-83 (Idaho 1980); Rivers v. Rivers, 381 So. 2d 573, 577 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1980); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W. 2d 278, 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973);
Armer v. Armer, 463 P.2d 818, 824-25 (Ariz. 1970); Baker v. Baker, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968); Spector v. Spector, 382 P.2d 659, 663 (Ariz. 1963); Vai v. Bank of America Nat') Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1961).
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person who transfers income-producing property to a trust (the "grantor") is liable
for the tax on the income generated by the property if the grantor has the power
to dispose of the corpus or income of the trust without the consent of the
beneficiaries, regardless of whether the grantor also is the trustee who has
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries under state law."z
Moreover, community property law may not provide sufficient remedies for
breach of the earner's fiduciary duties with respect to management of the
community income to justify imposing a tax liability on the nonearning spouse for
income over which the nonearning spouse has no direct control. Even if a
nonearning spouse has a cause of action against the earner for mismanagement of
community property, the injured spouse may not be able to obtain a remedy during
the existence of the community. Traditionally, courts provided interspousal
remedies during the existence of the marriage only in extreme cases.93 The
current equal management statutes in most community property states do not
clarify the extent to which legal remedies are available to the spouses during the
marriage or the nature of possible remedies."
Only three of the community property states provide statutory remedies that
are available during the existence of the community to a spouse complaining of
mismanagement. Under Louisiana community property law, a spouse can sue the
other spouse for damages caused by fraud or bad faith in the management of
community property.95 The California and Wisconsin statutes provide substantial
remedies to injured spouses. These remedies include the right to an accounting of
community property and debts to determine each spouse's rights of ownership in
and access to community propertys and the right to add the spouse's name to the
title of certain community property already titled in the other spouse's name.97
Under Wisconsin law, a spouse can obtain limitation or termination of any of the
other spouse's management and control rights upon a showing that marital
property has been or .is likely to be substantially injured by the other spouse's
gross mismanagement or waste.9s
The existence of these remedies seems to reinforce the present interest of a
noneaming spouse in community income." However, a spouse cannot actually
92. I.R.C. § 674 (1995).
93. See DeFuniak & Vaughn, supra note 89, §§ 151-152 (discussing the extraordinary cases
in which one spouse could sue the other under former law).
94. June Miller Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of the Wisconsin
Experience, 13 Community Prop. J. 1, 32 (1986).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2354 and La. R.S. 9:291 (1991).
96. Cal. Fain. Code § I 101(b) (West 1994) and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.70(2) (West 1993).
97. Cal. Faro. Code Ann. § 1101(c) (West 1994) and Wis. Stat. § 766.70(3) (1993).
98. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.70(4Xa) (West 1993).
99. Effland, supra note 60, at 19. Some community property states permit the non-managing
spouse to obtain a court order granting the spouse control over community property under the
management of the other spouse on a showing that the managing spouse is incompetent or cannot
be located. Cal. Fain. Code § 1103 (West 1994) and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 5.25, 5.26 (West
1993). These statutes, however, do not give a noneaming spouse any greater control over community
1997]
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enforce these remedies without a court order, even in California, where the
managing spouse is required to provide information to the nonmanaging spouse
"on request."'" Furthermore, the initial control over community property
resides in the managing spouse. A remedy is available only if the nonnanaging
spouse disputes the manager's right to manage the community property alone.
Because the noneamer's right to control community income earned by the other
spouse is contingent on the earner's mismanagement, the nonearner's interest in
community income is inchoate. Accordingly, the nonearning spouse should not
be liable for the tax on any of the community income unless and until a court
awards the noneamer control over that income.''
D. The Ability to Incur Debts
The only effective control a nonearning spouse has over community income
earned by the other spouse during the existence of the community stems from the
noneaming spouse's ability to incur debts. Under community property law, a
noneaming spouse may incur debts that will be satisfied with community property,
including the income that is earned by the other spouse. If a nonearning spouse
can find someone who is willing to extend credit and the nonearning spouse has
no assets with which to pay the debt, the creditor can seek payment for the debt
from community property. In many noncommunity property states, a nonearning
spouse also may incur debts for which the earning spouse is liable. Under the
doctrine of necessaries, the earning spouse is responsible for payment of expenses
incurred by the nonearning spouse for those things that are necessary for the
family.' 2 The liability of the earning spouse under the doctrine of necessaries
extends beyond the obligation to pay for items that are necessary to preserve
life. 03 What constitutes a "necessary" is determined by examining factors such
as the means, social position, and circumstances of both spouses.04.Thus,
property than the statutes in a noncommunity property state permitting spouses to become guardians
or conservators of property owned by an incompetent or absent spouse. See McClanahan, supra note
I, § 9:14.
100. Cal. Fain. Code §§ 721, 1100(e) (West 1994).
101. Under general principles of income taxation, a noneaming spouse who disputes the right
of the earning spouse to manage community income should not include the disputed amount in
income until a court grants control of the income-producing property or orders payments to be made
to the complaining spouse. A taxpayer who, like most individuals, uses the cash method of
accounting must include in income "all items which constitute gross income. .. for the taxable year
in which [they are] actually or constructively received." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(cX1)(i), 1.451-1 (a)
(1988). A nonearning spouse who contests the other spouse's right to manage community income
is not in constructive receipt of that income until the court awards the spouse control over the
income. Income i not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of it is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1988).
102. For a discussion of the doctrine of necessaries, see 1 Clark, supra note 26, § 7.3 and I
Oldfather, supra note 11, § 13.01[2][a].
103. 1 Clark, supra note 26, § 7.3.
104. 1 Oldfather, supra note Ii, § 13.01[21[a].
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necessaries include items and services that are appropriate for the noneaming
spouse's needs, the nonearning spouse's support, and the earning spouse's
means." 5 Courts have held that under the doctrine of necessaries, the term
"support" includes not only food, clothing, and shelter, but also includes medical
and dental care, legal services, furniture and household goods, and even a mink
coat.'°0
A number of noncommunity property states have family expense statutes
generally providing that the expenses of the family are chargeable against the
property of both the husband and the wife. 7 Under these statutes, a noneaming
spouse may incur debts for family expenses for which the earning spouse is
liable.' ° In some states, the liability extends to any article which in fact is used
by the family, whether or not it is considered a necessary.'
Admittedly, a spouse in a community property state has broader powers to
incur debts that can be satisfied from community income earned by the other
spouse than are afforded to a spouse in a noncommunity property state under the
doctrine of necessaries or under the family expense statutes. An earning spouse
generally is not liable under the doctrine of necessaries for debts incurred by the
other spouse if the couple is living apart through no fault of the earning
spouse."' Some courts have held that the doctrine of necessaries does not
impose liability on the earning spouse for debts incurred by the noneaming spouse
unless credit was extended to the earning spouse rather than to the nonearning
spouse."'
The family expense statutes reach only debts that are incurred in connection
with expenses of the family and for the education of children. A number of debts
that could be satisfied with community property are not chargeable under the
family expense statutes against the property of the spouse who did not incur the
debt. For example, it has been held that debts incurred by a husband in connection
with the operation of his business were not chargeable against the wife's
property." 2 In contrast, there are no legal restrictions on the ability of a
nonearning spouse in a community property state to incur debts that may be
satisfied with community assets.
105. 1 Clark, supra note 26, § 6.3.
106. See id. and the cases cited therein.
107. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-110 (West 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-
37(b) (West 1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 597.14 (West 1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 209, § 7 (Law. Co-
Op. 1994); Minn. Stalt. Ann. § 519.05 (West 1993); Mo. Rev. Stat § 451.250 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-201 (1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07-08(3) (1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 108.040 (1990); S.D.
Codified Laws § 25-2-11 (Michie 1992); Utah Code Ann.§ 30-2-9 (1995); W. Va. Code § 48-3-22
(1996); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-201 (Michie 1997).
1 08. For a discussion of the family expense statutes, see I Clark, supra note 26, § 7.1.
109. See cases cited in I Clark, supra note 26, § 6.1 n.71.
110. Id.
111. Id.




Nevertheless, the doctrine of necessaries and the family expense statutes give
a noneaming spouse in a noncommunity property state an interest in property of
the earning spouse, for which the nonearning spouse incurs no income tax
liability. The broader powers of a noneaming spouse to reach community assets
by such an indirect means as incurring debts should not be considered sufficient-
ly significant to warrant the disparate taxation of nonearning spouses in
community property and noncommunity property states.
Moreover, as a practical matter, it may be difficult for a noneaming spouse
in a community property state to obtain credit without obtaining the consent of
the earning spouse. In determining the creditworthiness of a spouse who applies
for credit, financial institutions in Wisconsin have ignored the marital property
held or generated by the nonapplicant spouse or have required both spouses to
sign the credit documents," 13 notwithstanding state law providing that a creditor
must consider a couple's marital property (along with the applicant's nonmarital
property) as available for debt satisfaction.""
Under the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"),"' creditors
may not discriminate against a loan applicant on the basis of sex or marital
status."' Regulation B..7 was promulgated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System pursuant to congressional delegation of authority to carry
out the purposes of the ECOA." s Regulation B provides, in part:
If a married applicant requests unsecured credit and resides in a
community property state, or if the property upon which the applicant
is relying is located in such state, a creditor may require the signature
of the spouse on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by
the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the
community property available to satisfy the debt in the event of default
if:
(i) Applicable state law denies the applicant power to manage or
control sufficient community property to qualify for the amount of
credit requested under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness; and
(ii) The applicant does not have sufficient separate property to qualify
for the amount of credit requested without regard to community
property." 9
113. Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community
Property: Wisconsin s Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 769, 789.
114. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.56(l) (West 1993).
115. Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 503, 88 Stat. 15212 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
1691-1691f (West 1982)).
116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(aX) (West 1982).
117. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1997) (as amended in 1989).
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691b (West 1982).
119. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(dX3) (1997) (as amended in 1989).
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In many cases, creditors base their decisions in extending credit on the future
earnings of the applicant. In Texas, where each spouse has the sole management,
control, and disposition of the community property that he or she would have
owned if single, including the spouse's earnings,' 0 it could be extremely
difficult for a nonearning spouse to obtain unsecured credit based on community
assets. '2 In fact, Texas community property law provides that community
property subject to a spouse's sole management is not subject to any nontortious
liabilities incurred by the other spouse during the marriage unless both spouses
are personally liable for the debt.'22 Thus, in Texas, a nonearning spouse may
not rely on the earnings of the other spouse to satisfy any nontortious debt.
In the other community property states, where spouseshave equal manage-
ment of community property,' it would seem that Regulation B should permit
a nonearning spouse to rely on the future earnings of the other spouse without
obtaining the earner's signature. However, Regulation B has been interpreted to
permit a creditor of a nonearning spouse in a community property state to require
the signature of the spouse upon whose future earnings the credit application is
based.'2 '
120. Tex. Far. Code Ann. § 522(a) (West 1993).
121. For a discussion of the application of the ECOA to spouses in Texas, see Linda M.
Zimmerman, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Texas Community Property Laws: When May
a Creditor Require a Spouse's Signature on Credit Instruments, 24 S. Tex. L.J. 273 (1983).
122. Tex. Far. Code Ann. § 5.61(b)(2) (West 1993).
123. See Arz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(B) (West 1991); Cal. Fain. Code § I100(a) (West
1994); Idaho Code § 32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code arts. 2346-2355; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230
(1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-14(A) (Michie Supp. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030
(West 1997); Wis. Stat § 766.51(1)(am) (1993). See also Wis. Stat. § 766.56(1) (1993) (requiring
a creditor to consider the marital property, along with the nonmarital property of a married person
who applies for credit).
124. United States v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Official
Staff Interpretations to Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 202, Supp. 1 (1977), interpreting 12 C.F.R. §
202.7(d)(5) (stating that if an applicant relies on the spouse's future earnings that as a matter of state
law cannot be characterized as community property until earned, the creditor may require the
spouse's signature). The Ninth Circuit's holding in 17 applies to creditors in Arizona, California,
Idaho, Nevada, and Washington. It is uncertain whether a court in a different circuit would agree.
Before the 17T case was decided, the Federal Reserve Board determined that regulation B precluded
a creditor from requiring the signature of the nonapplicant spouse in a community property state that
allows each spouse to share equally in the management of community property and the applicant
spouse applies for individual credit relying on the income of the nonapplicant spouse to pay the debt.
Fed. Reserve Bd. Interpretative Letter No. 73 (May 28, 1982). After 1TT was decided, creditors in
community property states were concerned that if they failed to follow the 17T procedures, they could
risk claims that they violated ECOA and regulation B by treating married persons more favorably
than unmarried persons. For a discussion of this issue, see Laura L. Regoers & John L. Culhane,
Jr., Survey: Consumer Financial Services Survey: Part l-Developments Under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and Regulation D, 43 Bus. Law. 1571, 1576 & n.31 (1988). The Federal Reserve
Board staff responded to the creditors' concerns by revising the staff commentary to Regulation B
and permitting creditors to either adopt the 17T procedures or not. The commentary now provides
in part:
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In United States v. IT Consumer Financial Corporation,'2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that creditors did not violate
the ECOA by requiring a married applicant's spouse to cosign a note as a
prerequisite to considering future earnings of a married applicant's spouse in
assessing the creditworthiness of the applicant for unsecured credit. The
creditors in the HT" case were concerned that, without the signature of the
earning spouse, the earner's future earnings would not be available to pay a debt
incurred by the nonearning spouse if the earnings became separate rather than
community property. A spouse's future earnings easily could become separate,
for example, because the couple divorced, one of the spouses died, the couple
moved to a noncommunity property state, or the spouses entered into a separation
of property agreement. The Ninth Circuit determined that while a nonearning
spouse in a community property state other than Texas has management and
control and may bind all of the community property, including the earnings of
the other spouse, the earning spouse's future earnings do not become community
property until they are earned. 26 Accordingly, a married applicant's equal
management power over community property does not extend to the other
spouse's future earnings, and the applicant cannot commit his or her spouse's
future earnings to repay the loan unless the spouse signs a promissory note or
some other document to accomplish that result.'
With respect to secured credit, Regulation B permits a creditor to require the
signature of the applicant's spouse on any instrument necessary under applicable
state law to make the property being offered as security available to satisfy the
debt in the event of default.' The types of instruments for which a spouse's
signature may be required include an instrument to create a valid lien, pass clear
title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings.' Under I7T, it will be
necessary for a noneaming spouse in a community property state to obtain the
signature of the eaming'spouse where it is necessary to commit future earnings
in order to obtain credit. The joinder requirements of community property law
also may require the signature of the other spouse when a nonearning spouse
applies for secured credit.
In community property states, the signature of a spouse may be required if the applicant
relies on the spouse's separate income. If the applicant relies on the spouse's future
earnings that as a matter of state law cannot be characterized as community property until
earned, the creditor may require the [spouse's] signature, but need not do so-even if it
is the creditor's practice to require the signature when an applicant relies on the future
earnings of a person other than a spouse.
53 Fed. Reg. 11,044, 11045 (1988), codified at 12 C.F.M. pt. 202, Supp. 1,§ 202.7(d)(5)-2.
125. 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987).
126. 816 F.2d at 490-91.
127. Id. at 491.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(dX4) (1997) (as amended in 1989).
129. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A nonearning spouse in a community property state should not be personally
liable for the tax on any of the community income earned by the other spouse.
Community property law does not give a nonearning spouse sufficient manage-
ment and control over the disposition of community income to justify imposing
personal liability on the nonearning spouse for any of the income earned by the
other spouse. Under community property law, the most significant rights of a
nonearning spouse to dispose of community income do not vest until the
community terminates. The right to dispose of community income as it is earned
resides primarily with the earner. In many respects, the rights of a nonearning
spouse with respect to community income in the year in which it is earned are
no greater than the rights of a nonearning spouse with respect to income earned
by the other spouse in a noncommunity property state. The liability for tax on
income earned by spouses should be uniform, regardless of whether a couple is
domiciled in a community property state or a noncommunity property state.

